The island of Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea, has witnessed an intermittently-bloody conflict since the latter part of the twentieth century. This island has over the past fifty years turned into a battle ground between the Greek and Turkish ethnic groups. Consequently, hundreds have died and thousands have become refugees and despite various efforts by third-parties, no solution has been achieved to date. This paper examines both the external and internal history of Cyprus and argues that Cyprus has a history of being utilized as a pawn on a larger European chess board and that the present stalemate of Turkey-EU relations has more to do with internal EU politics than with the Cyprus per se.
Introduction
The island of Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea, has witnessed an intermittently-bloody conflict since the latter part of the twentieth century. This island has over the past fifty years turned into a battle ground between the Greek and Turkish ethnic groups. 1 Consequently, hundreds have died and thousands have become refugees and despite various efforts by third-parties, no solution has been achieved to date. 2 Firstly, to understand the history of the island of Cyprus, this paper will examine both the external and internal history of Cyprus and provide a detailed overview of its history prior to the Turkish conquest of 1571, and the effects of the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which effectively ceded control of Cyprus from Turkish suzreanity to British administration. This paper argues that Cyprus has a history of being utilized as a pawn on a larger European chess board. Towards this end, this paper will engage in a critical examination of the events leading to the British control of Cyprus because it lays down the foundation for the next 122 years of struggle.
Secondly, this paper will set forth a comprehensive analsysis of the issue, reviewing both the internal and external dynamics of the conflict by using the rival-schools perspective by drawing on a number of authors who have examined this issue over the past thirty-six (36) years since the division of Cyprus. Each side has its own narrative for every significant event which has occurred in the history of Cyprus. On the Greek side, the year 1974 perpetuated the image of the "unspeakable" Turk as Orthodox Hellenism's eternal enemy, out to expel them from their ancestral homeland,in a melancholic fatalism coloured by betrayal, defeat and loss. Conversely, 1974 is heralded as a "peace operation" and celebrated by Turkish Cypriots as "an antidote to Greek Cypriot oppression." Neither side appears willing to acknowledge the other's narrative -not accept but acknowledge.
Thirdly, this paper will examine the failure of the 2004 Annan Plan through the contemporary perspective of both Turkish and Greek historians. In essence, the Turks argue that they "voted for peace and [the] reunification" of Cyprus and entirely blame the Greeks for the failure of the peace plan. On the other hand, the Greeks argue that the plan was unfair and dictated to them entirely by the UN and was a "no go" from the beginning. This paper will argue that, notwithstanding the great fanfare with which the Annan Plan was introduced, the proposal was dead on arrival because of the European Union's ("EU") offer of full membership to Greek Cyprus, without any requirement on the part of the Greek half to accept the peace plan. This paper will further argue that a middle of the road approach to the issue is most appropriate because there were failures on both sides, not the least of which was both parties' stubborn refusal to acknowledge the other side's real and legitimate concerns, which serve as the greatest obstacle to peace.
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Finally, this paper will examine the different aspects of the problem through the politicization of the Cyprus issue and conclude, what many historians and politicians have already perceived: the reunification of Cyprus has become the biggest stumbling block for Turkey's accenssion to the EU.
Report after report by the EU Commission has condemned Turkey's purportedly illegal occupation of the northern part of the island, without any examination or analysis of the Turkish side's perspective.
In addition, the EU has consistently ignored its promise to end the economic isolation of the selfdelared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus if it votes "yes" to the Annan Plan. More crucially, this paper will argue that the biggest obstacle to a resolution of the Cyprus problem is the EU's ill advised admission of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU without any comprehensive solution of the Cyprus question thus alleviating any pressure on the Greek side to make necessary concessions for a compromise and providing a vehicle for other EU member states to silently torpedo Turkey's EU prospects. Consequently, the resolution of the Cyprus problem has become detached from the facts on the ground. In other words, the Cyprus problem has become a useful means to block, obstruct, and otherwise impede the necessary negotiations between the EU and Turkey by other EU member states, most notably Austria, France, and Germany and a resolution of the Cyprus problem has become antithetical to the foreign policy of the EU.
I.

History of Cyprus: A step-by-step analysis
The island of Cyprus is generally viewed as uniquely a Greek enclave, and historically a Greek island. 3 However, a historical assessment shows that this is not entirely correct. While it is not the ambit of this paper to examine the pre-1974 history of Cyprus, a detailed overview of the history of 4 HAKAN O. YALINCAK 2009 © All rights reserved. more than 200,000, consisting almost entirely of Greek speaking people. 5 After the 1571 conquest, about 30,000 Turks were sent in from the mainland in order to form a Turkish element in the population. Ottoman rule continued until 1878 and during that period, there was no overt conflict between the Turks and Greeks of the island. Rather, the Ottoman authority abolished feudalism and serfdom, terminating the Latin persecution of the Greek-speaking Christians as well. The Ottomans also officially recognized the Greek Orthodox Church as an autocephalous, self governing
Archbishopric. The Greek Cypriots enjoyed selfgovernment, mainly through the church, which regulated their social, educational and religious affairs. As noted by Yılmas, this system, indeed, fortified the cohesion of the ethnic Greek population. 6 2. The Beginning of British Rule
As discussed more fully in the next section of this paper, with all of the added European intrigue, bargaining, and gamesmanship that went on, in 1878, the Ottomans "leased" Cyprus to the British with the understanding that the British would help the Ottomans' defense against the Russians. 
3.
Is Cyprus really a Greek enclave?
As shown above, while the island does have a uniquely Greek character, it cannot be said that it is a historically Greek island, any more than any other historically Greek colonies. Otherwise, most of the Mediterranean could be argued is really Greek, because the inhabitants, traders, and cultures of each of the previous powers and empires referred to above have had a significant impact on the demographics and history of Cyprus. In otherwords, as discussed more fully in the next section, this idea that Cyprus belongs exclusively to the Greeks is a view that sprung to the forefront with the rise of nationalism in the late 19th century. It is important to note that, as with most empires which once ruled vast swaths of land, it is not surprising that Greek culture and heritage were embedded into the island's history. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid., n.4 above, 30. See also Necatiğil (1982): 1-2 (although this is not a focal part of my paper, I would note that this is source is useful in also underscoring why, contrary to the Greek view, the 1974 invasion by the Turks was legal -it was enshrined in the Cypriot Constitution). 7 Kinross (1977) : 520-521. 8 Ibid. improvements, a guarantee that provincial revenues should be spent on provincial needs, and the establishment of a mixed Muslim-Christian commission to supervise the working of these reforms.
This Andrassy Note, was approved by the other powers and accepted by the Sultan early in February, however, it was rejected by the rebels because the rebels as useless without a guarantee by the powers. 30 Meanwhile the fighting was spreading and there was a risk of it becoming a general Balkan conflagration.
31
The foreign ministers of the Dreikaiserbund met in Berlin in May 1876, and prepared a new reform program, the Berlin Memorandum, which was an extension of the earlier Andrassy Note. The
Turkish government was to provide funds to settle the refugees in their homes, the Christians were to retain their arms for the time being, and the consuls of the powers were to supervise the implementing of these reforms. The Memorandum was submitted to the French and Italian and approved, however, the British government refused to follow the others and in doing so made the possibility of an early and peaceful settlement nonexistent. Benjamin Disraeli, then the Prime Minister of England,was determined to pursue an independent policy instead of following behind the Dreikaiserbund. The
Memorandum had been prepared without Britain's being consulted and now it was presented for approval with the request for a reply in two days. Disraeli sarcastically observed that Britain was being treated as though she were Montenegro or Bosnia. . This misunderstanding was to cause difficulties between the two powers before the crisis was resolved.
Competing European Political and Policy Aims Leads to Russia's Declaration of War on the Ottoman Empire
During the opening months of the war after Serbian and Montenegro entered the conflict the Turks were winning the Pan-Slavs appealed to the Tsar and the Tsar finally took action and dispatched a forty-eight-hour ultimatum to Constantinople demanding an armistice of six weeks. The Turks accepted the armistice on October 31, 1876. 36 The powers agreed to send representatives to a conference in Constantinople to work out the terms. Hence, the Constantinople Conference opened on December 12, 1878; the British delegate was Lord Salisbury, and the conference quickly reached a compromise agreement. The main provisions were that Bulgaria should be divided into an eastern and western province, Bosnia-Herzegovina unite into one province, and each of the three provinces to have a considerable degree of autonomy, including a provincial assembly and a local police force. Serbia and Montenegro were to lose no territory and Montenegro was to be allowed to keep parts of BosniaHerzegovina and Albania. These terms were presented as the "irreducible minimum" which the powers would accept. 37 The Turks rejected them, because they knew they had strong popular backing.
The specific reason for this strong and profoundly stupid stand was because the British ambassador, war. However, the cabinet rejected the proposal, fearing that it would lead to an alliance with Turkey. 43 The Russians were making quick progress into the Balkans. They had traversed Rumania, and crossed the Danube on June 23 and then occupied the Shipka Pass, opening the way to southern Bulgaria. The further the Russians advanced the higher the tension mounted in Britain. Bismarck was gravely concerned with the danger of a general conflagration and again advanced his favorite scheme for a wholesale partition of the Ottoman Empire. However, Disraeli distrusted the German chancellor and refused to consider his proposal and convinced his cabinet to vote on July 21 that war should be declared if the Russians occupied Constantinople or did not make arrangements to retire immediately.
The gathering tension however, subsided for some time when the Russians met an unexpected reverse at Plevna, a Turkish fortress located close to the Russian bridge over the Danube. The Russians made repeated attempts to take the fortress by storm but were repulsed with heavy losses opposition to this settlement mainly from the British, and probably took more than they expected to keep in order to have some surplus for bargaining. The Russian program for the peace was developed during the war in conferences in the field between the Tsar and his advisers. The division which developed among the Russian leaders concerned not only the gains which should be made, but also the extent to which the wishes of the other European powers could be ignored. Those who sought to achieve a maximum program also wanted to negotiate the peace terms unilaterally with the Turks, despite the fact that they would inevitably conflict with other European treaties.
In the winter of 1877-1878 a program for the peace was drawn up which would have ended Ottoman rule in Europe and which also would have given Russia a strong strategic position in Asia Minor from which she could have made further moves toward Mesopotamia and the Persian gulf. The real gainer in the Treaty of Berlin, was England. By refusing the plan of partition and by preventing its being imposed upon her by a dissolution of Turkey, England had frustrated the scheme which was intended to strengthen the Imperial Alliance and secure Germany's domination in Europe.
The dissolution of that Alliance meant the weakening of Germany and the strengthening of England. 53 Ibid., 35. 54 Ibid., 38. 55 Ibid., 39.
HAKAN O. YALINCAK 2009 © All rights reserved.
The London Agreement laid down the limits of the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano, and Russia was able now to consent to its being discussed as a whole at the Congress, without fearing unacceptable demands being put on her. 57 The Congress of Berlin was opened on June 13, 1878. Bismarck elected as president, proposed at once that the questions should be discussed according to their importance, and that therefore that of Bulgaria should be first. 58 Russia and England agreed in London as to the boundaries and division of Bulgaria, but the question of the organization of the southern part was left to be settled at the Congress.
59
The main objective of Disraeli, at the conference, was "consolidating and restoring the authority and stability of Turkey." 60 At the Congress, however, the Tsar specifically requested the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the province, seeing it as a measure of security. Both England and Russia remained equally unyielding and the impasse was only solved when Bismarck tried to mediate and stopped the British delegation from going home. It is also important to note that in this conflict over Bulgaria, England was strongly supported by Austria. By examining the consequences of the Congress of Berlin, it is evident that the many provinces of the Ottoman Empire were nothing more than small chess pieces in the European balance of power, that were used as objects for negotiation and bartering, ostensibly under the guise of protecting the minority Christian rights in the Balkans. However, the ultimate results of the Congress of Berlin show that the Europeans powers were less interested in protecting any particular minority group's rights and more focused on extending their spheres of influence and, in the case of Germany, Austria and Russia completing the wholescale ejection of the Muslim Turks, from Europe -a process that had been almost five hundred years in the making for Christian Europe.
II.
How Does the Consequences of the Congress of Berlin Relate to the Cyprus Conflict Today?
As evident from the contrasting viewpoints presented below, there is significant disagreement as to relations between the two communities before the British assumed control of Cyprus in 1878. 75 However, it is generally agreed that in the period after the British took control of Cyprus "Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism and intercommunal distrust slowly intensified. independence formulated a complex power sharing structure pursuant to which there was to be a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president who was given veto power. The 1960
Cypriot constitution also "incorporated the guarantee treaty between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and
Britain" which outlawed enosis and taksim and allowed Greece, Turkey or Britain to take steps to unilaterally remedy a breach of the treaty. 89 This is a point that is often overlooked by Greek historians who claim that the 1974 Turkish invasion, discussed later in this paper, was illegal. On other hand, not surprisingly, given the incorporation of the guarantee treaty into the constitution, most Turks argue that Turkey's invasion was legal. This complex arrangement for Cyprus, given its unworkable power sharing arrangement, held the seeds of the destruction of bicommunal existence on Cyprus. 90 The president of Cyprus at the time, Archbishop Markarios, never supported the constitution and insisted it wouldn't be binding on Greek Cypriots after independence. 91 As noted by Marikedes, the Cypriot constitution of 1960 "institutionalized ethno-communalism, because it failed to take into account "the psychological and sociological fact that the power-protection system" increased "suspicions, antagonism and conflict between the communities because of the discriminations and uncertainties involved." 92 "The sectarian and divisive provisions of the 1960 arrangement constituted the seeds that led to its collapse three years later."
93
As argued by Yılmas, the 1960 Cypriot constitution was a failure for the reasons stated above and because it did nothing to encourage consensus between competing factions within the government.
Furthermore, the Cypriot constitution of 1960 cemented this state of affairs and did nothing to ameliorate it. As noted by Yılmas, the "birth" of Cyprus as an independent state more closely resembled that of an arranged marriage neither party wanted -with both parties in love with different suitors who hovered at the edge of the wedding yet refused to say "I object" when asked. As noted above, the constitutional arrangement quickly proved unworkable because "both identity groups remained adversarial... with each seeking to gain advantages within the new 89 Ibid., n.80 above, 33; see also n.87 above, 26. 90 Ibid., n.80 above, 36. 91 Ibid., n.87 above, 41. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. The Cyprus conflict is, by all accounts, complex and clouded with issues of ethnic nationalism, and discrimination. The contrasting and rival approach of each community, as evident in the writings of the historians of both communities present a dizzyingly complex problem from which to embark on successful peacemaking and peacebuilding strategies.
B. Efforts to Resolve the Cyprus Conflict
In 
Conclusion
A. The Outsiders Must Stop Intervening in the Cyprus Conflict
The essential question that must be asked, in light of the history of the Cyprus conflict presented above, is will the essential balance between external inputs to the negotiation and Cypriot ownership of the outcome prove possible to strike, as it has never been possible to do before? 137 As shown above, through the examination of the external and internal history of Cyprus, there is no easy or quick solution to the problems separating Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Both sides have outstanding claims and deeply mistrust one another.
As noted by Yılmas, closely linked with the problem is the psychological barriers between the two Cypriot communities. 140 As suggested by Yılmas, the issue requires particular attention and calls for carefully-planned strategies, which target areas of nationalistic education on the island that leads historic emnities to be transmitted from one generation to the other, mutual stereotypes that inhibit creative thinking and dialogue, as well as economic gap between the two communities.
141
C. Turkey's EU Accession Negotiations Must Be Decoupled from the Resolution of the Cyprus conflict
Turkey's EU accession must be decoupled from a solution to the Cyprus problem. Towards this end, the EU must redouble its efforts to unblock the Cyprus stalemate by living up to its 2004 promise to the Turkish Cypriots to allow direct trade with the rest of the EU. 142 This promise was made in return for a "yes" vote in the failed 2004 Annan Plan referendum. 143 If this promise is kept, the onus will shift to Turkey, to unblock its ports and normalize relations with the Greek half of
Cyprus. This in turn will allow the EU to unblock the negotiation chapters, which were originally blocked due to Turkey's refusal to open up its ports to the Greek half of Cyprus. However, recent developments on this front are entirely unpromising, as the European Commission, after finally taking up the direct trade proposal with Northern Cyprus, ruled that it was without authority to involve itself Next, as noted by Turkish Hürriyet daily writer Yusuf Kanlı, the EU must acknowledge that the admission of the island of Cyprus to the EU, before a settlement of the Cyprus problem, was a mistake and the rest of the EU must apply pressure on Cyprus to transform itself from the "single issue member state" it has become, towering over Turkey and threatening to hold the entire accession negotiations hostage, to a member state that tries to find a solution to the problem as quickly as possible. 145 The alternative of continuing the course is simply destined for failure. The Greek half of Cyprus, a nation of less than 500,000, has tried the present course of action for 36 years and it has not led to results. This is despite the fact that it has succeeded in numerous international circles and in the public relations sphere of earning almost universal condemnation for the Turks and white-washing the history of the island -in other words, it has succeeded in silencing the Turkish narrative. However, this required transformation of Cyprus from a "single member state" is entirely an unrealistic proposition, not the least because politicians seldom acknowledge mistakes, and because the admission of Cyprus was the quid pro quo --the price the EU was willing to pay to secure Greek approval for the admission of other European states, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, as a part of its "bing bang" enlargement, which was realized in 2004 and 2007. In sum, the EU knew exactly the predicament it was getting itself into and was perfectly content with the potential results.
The present state of affairs should not suprise anyone because, as was the case during the 19th century, the island of Cyprus has become a mere pawn on a wider European chess board. Many member states hide behind the Cyprus problem to stall accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey. 146 The Cyprus conflict has increasingly become detached from the facts on the ground and increasingly been politicized through outside forces, as evidenced by the useful political cover it has provided for various EU member states such as France and Germany to stall Turkish accession to the EU.
D. The Peace Process Can Be Reinvegorated Despite the Failure of the Annan Plan
As shown above, the failure of the Annan Plan on the Greek side was due to the pushy and over optimistic aims of the plan. However, a "bottom up" approach by dealing with the larger, community based problems to help both communities understand one another is necessary to form cohesion and strike a unified Cypriot identity. Indeed, as shown above, there has never been a "Cypriot identity" and unification will require the creation of such an identity for mutual understanding and trust to take place. However, so long as the Cyprus conflict is tied to Turkey's EU accession negotiations, this process, which should have started thirty-six (36) years ago when Turkey 145 Ibid. invaded, will never occur because it does serve any of the political or economic interest of the foreign actors.
Ironically, if Turkey's EU accession fails, as many of the foreign actors hope to serve their own political agenda, the island faces the real and undeniable certainty of permanent division -a fact of life that both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots will have to live with. Fortunately, unlike most other conflicts, it is likely that this conflict will be resolved one way or another in the next five years because, given the fact that Cyprus has blocked five of the EU accession chapters and France has blocked another eight of the EU accession chapters, there are hardly any new chapters left for the EU and Turkey to negotiate and this problem will come to a head: either permanent partition or a decoupling of the external forces, which have prevented a resolution.
